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Understanding Japan’s Civil Service System: 
Norms, Meritocracy, and Institutional Change1
Abstract
This article aims to elucidate the tradition of Japan’s public administration 
emphasizing the civil service system. A number of studies explain the 
impact of the tradition (norms, values, and institutions), in shaping the 
process and result of public administration reform. By applying the 
historical institutionalism perspective, this study reveals how the legacy of 
the past, the tradition promoted by the Meiji Restoration, creates the new 
tradition of public administration. This study selects Japan as a typical case 
representing Asian developmentalists. The remarkable Meiji restoration 
marked the process of adoption and adjustment of the Germanic traditions 
in the bureaucracy modernization. Norm institutionalization has established 
the new norms and civil service system. The basic norms consist of legality, 
consensus, and seniority. It develops the “kyaria” denoting recruitment, 
selection, and promotion influenced by seniority, long term performance, 
and prestigious university recommendation and produces competent 
and dominant mandarins in the policy process. However, the parliament 
continuously initiates the reform to reduce the mandarin’s domination 
and heighten political control over the bureaucracy. The reform has not 
yet changed the power balance of two institutions since the ”kyaria’s” 
embeddedness in Japan’s polity produces two consequences. First, it 
contributes to public administration modernization. The mandarin’s 
outstanding performance increases political legitimacy and social 
acceptance to the “kyaria”system. Second, the parliament cannot drastically 
reduce the mandarin’s role since the lifetime employment model enriches 
them with knowledge and experience of the government affairs. Conducting 
cautious reform and, at the same time, working closely with the mandarin 
are the primary reform strategy of the parliament.
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Introduction
The basic idea of civil service reform emphasizes the need to 
develop fundamental values and institutions that conform with the 
democratic principle. However, the reform for creating professionalism, 
integrity, and competent civil service is not a simple process, even for the 
advanced democratic countries. Belief systems and norms embedded 
in policymakers as well as the civil servant, social, and political context 
(as well as the existing institution of the civil service) have shaped the 
process and results of the reform (Massey, 2011). Consequently, the focus 
of reform, strategy, and its impact vary among countries (Horton, 2011). 
Responding to the dynamic nature of civil service reform, many public 
administration scholars have been studying civil service system reform 
beyond the scope of the civil service system as a personnel system of the 
government (Raadschelders, Toonen, & Van Der Meer, 2015).
Painter (2010) and Drechsler (2013) reveal the impact of the 
tradition, or so-called norms, values and institutions, in shaping the 
process and result of public administration reform. Further, they 
conclude that Western traditions (Anglo-American and European 
Continental) shape the administrative reform in Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America countries. However, the reform does not take place in a vacuum 
situation. Existing public administration traditions of the countries, 
indeed, determine the reform minded-actors’ preference in adopting 
the reform project promoted by the Western polity (Yesilkagit, 2010). In 
this sense, civil service reform and its result designates the combination 
between the existing norms, values and institutions and the imported 
Western tradition (Raadschelders, Toonen, & Van Der Meer, 2015). Such 
norm interfusion creates new norms of the civil service through the 
institutionalization process.  
Following the argument, this article explains how Japanese 
traditions determine civil service system development? Studies on 
public administration reform, particularly the civil service system, have 
shown Japan’s civil service system as the typical case. The combination 
of local norms and the Western (European Continental) has resulted 
in distinctive features of public administration (Painter, 2010). The 
remarkable restoration of the Meiji era (1868-1912) marked the process 
of adoption and adjustment of the Germanic tradition in the bureaucracy 
modernization (Akizuki, 2010). The combination of two traditions 
produced a vital role of a central bureaucracy that later contributed to 
the success of the Japanese developmentalist state (Painter, 2010). This 
study approaches Japan as a case representing Asian developmentalist 
states, such as South Korea (Minns, 2006; Burns, 2015). Pivotal roles of 
senior Japanese bureaucrats (the mandarin) carry out three basic norms: 
legality, consensus, and seniority. Such norms create the “kyaria”system 
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designating senior officials’ recruitment and 
promotion system based on seniority and long-
term performance (Wright, 1999; Mishima, 2013; 
Mishima, 2017).
Studies on the contribution of norms and 
belief systems to develop the civil service system 
have been academic concerns of many scholars. 
Nakamura (2003) reveals how the historical 
development of Japan’s elite-based bureaucracy 
undermines civil service reform. Painter (2010) 
concludes that the interfusion between Japanese 
and Western tradition has resulted in Japan’s 
hybrid characteristic’s civil service consisting of 
bureaucracy’s transcendence and sectionalism. 
Furthermore, Akizuki (2010) and Imanaka (2010) 
analyse the impact of the past legacy, which was 
marked by the Meiji Restoration, to modernize 
Japan’s public administration. Meanwhile, Burns 
(2015) elucidates how Confucianism, which 
is the belief system of the Japanese polity, 
and the developmentalist state orientation 
produce the central role of the bureaucracy in 
economic development. This article aims to enrich 
the civil service system study using historical 
institutionalism by studying previous research 
on the civil service system. The approach reveals 
how the legacy of the past, which is norms, 
values, and belief system promoted by the Meiji 
Restoration, creates the new tradition of Japan’s 
public administration. Emphasizing the civil 
service system determines the civil service system 
(Raadschelders, Toonen, & Van Der Meer, 2015)
Studies on civil service systems in various 
countries, both in the advanced as well as the 
developing democracies, show a variation in 
the norms-belief system, institution, as well as 
the operational-managerial level of the human 
resource (Massey, 2011). In fact, the differences 
also exhibit themselves among the Western 
democratic countries, such England (Sylvia, 
2011; Parry, 2011; Sausman & Locke., 2004) 
and the United States ( (Jay M. Shafritz, Riccucci, 
Rosenbloom, & Hyde, 2001); (Halligan, 2003; 
Anagnoson, 2011) . The civil service systems 
of Asian, African, and Latin American countries 
have its distinctiveness, although they adopt the 
universal merit principle.
The variation of civil service systems cannot 
be separated from the tradition, institutional 
evolution, history, as well as external pressure 
(Mahoney, 2001; Painter & Peters,, 2010; and 
Horton, 2011). Painter and Peters (2010) explained 
that the regime development and institutional 
evolution denote a path-dependent change. 
The institutional reform does not automatically 
replace the established institution but creates the 
institutional imprint that designates its norms. 
The institutional imprint or so-called as the 
legacy of the past will determine the subsequent 
reform (Mahoney, 2001; Mahoney & Thelen, 
2010). Following the premise of path-dependent, 
Painter and Peters (2010) concluded that the 
distinct feature of the civil service system in Asian 
countries is the result of the combination between 
local norms-belief system and the Western. The 
combining tradition has shaped the ingredient of 
the civil service system, such as Japan (Kim, 2002; 
and Nakamura A. , 2003).
For examining how the tradition of Japan’s 
public administration contributes to the reform 
and creates distinctive features of the civil 
service system, this article consists of four 
parts. First, theoretical discussion on historical 
institutionalism, meritocracy, and civil service 
reform. Second, the institutionalization of the 
Japanese public administration norms advocated 
by the Meiji Emperor; third, sequential public 
administration reform as the response to the 
mandarin domination in the policy process; 
and the last part, explaining the impact of the 
“kyaria”system to the civil service system. 
Meritocracy, the Civil Service Reform, and the 
Historical Institutionalism Perspective
Studies on the civil service system have 
extended beyond the focus of human resource 
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management. Many prominent scholars, such as 
Bekke, Perry, & Toonen (1996); Raadschelders & 
Meer (2007); and  Raadschelders, Toonen, & Meer, 
(2015) explained that the new institutionalism had 
provided a comprehensive analytical framework 
in studying the civil service system. One of the 
influential conceptions was described by Morgan 
and Perry (1998) as quoted by Bekke, Perry, and 
Toonen (1996, p. 2): 
“…civil service system formally as 
mediating institutions that mobilize 
human resources in the service of 
the affairs of the state in the given 
territory. …civil service systems are 
structures, that is, a combination of 
rules and authority relationships that 
act as bridges between the polity[ies] 
or state and specific administrative 
organizations.”
Following the conception of the civil service 
system, one should understand the essence of the 
new institutionalism perspective, particularly the 
historical institutionalism. Institutions can be 
defined, “…as the formal or informal procedures, 
routines, norms and conventions embedded 
in the organizational structure of the polity or 
political economy”. Following the definition, 
thus, institutions can be formed as (Hall & Taylor, 
1996), “…range from the rules of a constitutional 
order or the standard operating procedures of a 
bureaucracy to the conventions governing trade 
union behavior or bank-firm relations”. In the same 
token, Kasner (1998), quoted by Bekke, Perry, dan 
Toonen (1996, p.3), describes an institution as 
follows: “the derivative character of individual 
and the persistence of something—behavioral 
patterns, roles, rules, organizational charts, 
ceremonies—over time.” From such perspective, 
Bekke, Perry, and Toonen (1996) elucidate that 
studies of civil service systems highlight how the 
system determines public officer behavior and 
how citizen perception of the civil service and 
other social institutions shape the development 
of the civil service system. 
The historical institutionalism perspective 
stresses a reciprocal relationship between the 
social-political context, the existing institution, 
and the actor’s behavior. Such a  relationship 
denotes the evolution of established institutions 
and actors in responses to a changing political 
landscape in a temporal manner (Thelen, 2004). In 
the same token, Pierson (2000) and Thelen (1999) 
explain that continuing reciprocal relations 
throughout time will determine the institutional 
development that produces formal rules, policies, 
and norms.
A  c iv i l  s e r v i c e  re fo r m  i n te n d s  to 
institutionalize merit principles into public servant 
behavior and the institutional arrangement of civil 
service. Reforming the civil service system in many 
countries is a significant part of a democratic 
transformation (Shepard, 2003). Universalism, 
professionalism, and public integrity are the 
primary principle of meritocracy that supports 
public performance in delivering services. 
Shepard (2003, p. 7) provides a solid definition 
of meritocracy, as described below:
 “…insulation from undue political 
influence and – to the extent possible 
– arrangements to promote the 
productivity of civil servants…entrance 
to the service based on competitive 
exams; protection of civil servants 
from arbitrary removal; protection of 
their political neutrality; policing of 
this service by an independent body.”
Historically, meritocracy was promoted 
to transform public administration following 
the political change of continental European 
countries and the United States at the beginning 
of the 19th century. The changing social-political-
economic context had created a basic idea of 
meritocracy (Shepard, 2003). First, creating 
government efficiency and public integrity in 
delivering public services, and second, developing 
a just government and free from the political 
parochialism in maintaining public affairs. The 
idea has been influenced by the success of the 
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French revolution that diminished the absolute 
monarchy (Horton, 2011). 
In the modern era, the development of 
meritocracy is addressing the impact of political 
interference on the civil service. New democratic 
Asian countries have been striving to deal with 
the patron-client relationship that shapes the 
relationships between politicians and bureaucrats. 
The critical issue is the prevalent authoritarianism 
that shapes the belief system of the civil service 
institution. Thus, the reform is not automatically 
replacing the old norms since it has embedded in 
the public bureaucracy (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith., 
2002). The interaction between the embedded 
norms and institutions and the new value of 
meritocracy in the reform process becomes a 
critical issue in Asian democratic countries, 
such as Japan and Indonesia. As Peters and 
Painter (2010) and (Drechsler, 2013) explain, the 
interaction has resulted in a distinct feature of 
Asian public administration. Thus, understanding 
the realm of Asian civil service should apply a 
framework covering not only the human resource 
management level but also a macro and mezzo 
level of analysis. 
Bekke,  Perry,  and Toonen (1996); 
Raadschelders, Toonen and van der Meer (2007), 
and van der Meer, Raadschelders and Toonen, 
(2015) promote a framework underlying three 
levels of the civil service system. First, the 
constitutional level highlights the civil service 
system as the belief system, norm, or a symbol. 
According to Boin & Christensen (2008), norms 
can have three forms as follows, first, cognitive 
describing how the practice and routine help 
actors to meet the objective. The second form 
is the regulative. It guides actors to exercise the 
existing practice routine, and third, normative 
denoting the appropriateness of the practice 
routine. The norm institutionalization is taking 
place through an agreement process in which 
actors reach a consensus of norms validity and 
functionality. Thus, the consensus will lead to 
the norms appropriateness within the social and 
political context (Finnemore and Sikkink, quoted 
by Boin and Christensen, 2008). 
The norms institutionalization is a dynamic 
process involving actors’ preferences and their 
response to the social and political context. At 
least three conditions will determine actors to 
accept the norm (Boin & Christensen, 2008). First, 
actors believe that the norm is representative of 
the prevalent practice routine. In this context, 
the actor will adopt the norm when they ensure 
that the norm’s advocate has social-political 
legitimacy and knowledge. Second, the norm 
should exhibit its validity and functionality 
in its relations to tradition and fundamental 
values of organizations since it represents the 
organization’s objective. Furthermore, last third, 
the norm institutionalization satisfies the power 
constellation among competing actors within an 
organization or polity. 
The norm institutionalization will produce 
a new practice-routine of the organization. Thus, 
to ensure the embeddedness of norms to the 
organization, the actor will translate it to various 
organizational instruments, such as policy, 
operational-routine, control mechanism, training 
manual, recruitment, dismissal, and promotion 
mechanism. Further, the embedded norm leads 
to organizational coherency (Boin & Christensen, 
2008). Such argumentation stresses that a civil 
service system marks the dominant norms or 
values of society. 
The belief system, thus, will shape the 
idea and objective of the civil service system. 
However, the norm institutionalization is not a 
linear process but dynamic in nature. The process 
invites the pros and cons of competing actors. The 
resistance arises due to the norm’s incompatibility 
with the existing culture and practice routine 
of the organization (Boin & Christensen, 2008). 
Such dynamic nature takes place through the 
institutional mechanism of the change (Immergut, 
1998).
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Second,  co l lect ive  choice  level  or 
institutional level. The framework approaches 
the civil service system as a political institution 
that provides an arena for competing actors to 
promote their intention. As an institution, the 
civil service system designates norms, roles, and 
rules of the game shape the actor’s behaviour 
and performance. The system consists of four 
aspects: authority, public servant functions, 
accountability, and the roles of public servants in 
the policy-making process. Third, the operational 
level stresses human resource management. The 
level concentrates on recruitment, selection, 
promotion, training-development as well as 
individual performance. One of the pivotal 
reforms in this level is improving public servant 
competency through an open selection for filling 
a public position.
From the historical institutionalism postulate, 
the change at the institutional and operational 
levels denote the dynamic institutional mechanism. 
According to Immergut (1998, p. 18), institutional 
mechanism designates “…structuring options, 
calculating of interests and formation of goals 
by rules, structures, norms, and ideas.” Thus, 
institutional changes relate to changing social 
and political landscape that allows the competing 
actors to utilize the existing institution to gain their 
preferences. The institution has an essential role 
since it shapes actors’ choice and action, but at the 
same time, actors’ maneuvers will impact the fate of 
the institution shortly. Therefore, actors’ preferences 
should not be seen as static but dynamic since 
their preference and action respond to the existing 
institutional setting (Immergut, 1998; Thelen, 
1999). Thus, institutional change is taking place due 
to the actors’ decision to adopt the change. 
Methods
In studying the civil service reform and 
outcome of Japan, this research applies to a case 
study. Gerring (2007, p.20) defines a case study 
as follows, “…may be understood as the intensive 
study of a single case where the purpose of that 
study is – at least in part – to shed light on a 
larger class of cases (a population).” This study 
selects Japan’s meritocracy and civil service 
system by using the typical case method. The 
typical case study emphasizes a case representing 
similar cases. This study intends to reveal the 
causal mechanism in the observed phenomena 
(Seawright and Gering, 2008). Japan represents 
cases that describe how the combination of 
endogenous public administration tradition and 
European Continental, notably the Germanic 
tradition, create the merit system of Asian 
countries, mainly the East Asian region (Painter 
and Peters, 2010). Such a combination has 
resulted in Japan’s strong central bureaucracy and 
contributed to the success of the developmentalist 
state (Minns, 2006). 
Results and Discussion
Institutional configuration of Japan’s public 
administration has resulted in a strong central 
bureaucracy denoting the dominant roles of the 
mandarin (the senior bureaucrat) in the policy 
process (Nakamura, 2003; and Mishima, 2017). 
The institutional evolution can be traced from 
the Meiji Emperor modernization’s initiative 
to diminish the samurai feudal system and to 
establish a new bureaucracy to support the 
empire. To end the samurai’s dominant role, 
the emperor urged to recruit a young-talented 
employee to serve the empire. The modernization 
or known as the Meiji restoration involved 
prominent scholars from Europe who promoted 
the vital role of bureaucracy and the Japanese 
constitutional monarchy. One of the significant 
decisions of modernization was the appointment 
of the first prime minister who managed the 
empire’s interests along with the establishment 
of the imperial university. The university was 
dedicated to train and educate the cadre of a public 
servant (Akizuki, 2010; Shimizu, 2020). These 
two imperial decisions stressed Emperor Meiji’s 
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intention to replace the samurai’s predominant 
political influence over the empire. Nonetheless, 
modernization did not diminish the basic norm of 
the samurai that is to serve the empire. Instead, 
the restoration utilized the norm to build public 
employees’ mental models.  
A combination of the Meiji’s norms and 
the Western produced a new characteristic 
of the bureaucracy. The institutionalization 
of the bureaucracy’s roles and function had 
resulted in the dominant mandarin roles in the 
future (Mishima, 2013). Later on, features of 
Japanese bureaucracy triggered parliamentary 
members’ actions to decrease the extending 
roles of the mandarin. Members of Parliament 
(MPs) argued that the mandarins are too 
exclusive and tend to devote themselves to their 
ministerial interest instead of obliging to the 
elected government mission (Painter, 2010). Thus, 
reducing the central bureaucracy’s dominant 
role was the pivotal issue of civil service reform, 
particularly after the 1918 national election. The 
election established the ruling party to run the 
cabinet. Having the parliamentary majority, the 
government strengthened its power to control the 
public bureaucracy and displace the emperor’s 
predominant power over the civil service system 
(Kim, 2002; Imanaka, 2010). 
Public administration reform has been a 
national political agenda that has shaped the MPs 
and the mandarin relationship since the 2000s. 
Reconfiguring the delegation-accountability 
model denoting politics and administrative 
relations, reducing the mandarin’s dominant 
roles in the policy process, and re-arranging the 
civil service system, particularly the “kyaria” 
system, are primary objectives of the reform 
(Mishima, 2017). Nonetheless, the reform is not 
an easy task due to the mandarin’s persistence 
and the predominant “kyaria”system in shaping 
Japanese bureaucracy. As a result, the public 
administration reform has not yet succeeded in 
reducing bureaucracy’s pivotal roles. 
From the historical institutionalism point of 
view, this article reveals how the dynamic nature 
of reciprocal relations between the prevalent 
dominant roles of the senior bureaucrat and the 
MPs determine the civil service reform. First, the 
central bureaucracy’s vital role has its roots from 
the long tradition of the Meiji and institutional 
evolution of the bureaucracy (Akizuki, 2010; 
Nakamura & Kikuchi, 2011; Burns, 2015). Second, 
the Meiji restoration marked the institutional 
evolution leading to the creation of the “kyaria” 
system. The system produces the mandarin who 
dominates public bureaucracy and policy processes 
in its relations to MPs (Nakamura, 2003; Painter, 
2010; Mishima, 2017). Third, the development of 
the “kyaria”shapes Japan’s public administration’s 
distinctive characteristic: ministerial loyalism. It 
represents the strong commitment of bureaucrats 
to their home ministry at the expense of the whole 
elected government. Further, it undermined the 
prime minister’s political authority in maintaining 
ministries since the mandarin control the 
bureaucracy (Nakamura, 2003; Masujima, 2005; 
Painter, 2010; Mishima, 2017).
The Norm and Symbol of the Civil Service
The collapse of the predominant samurai’s 
feudal system had opened the opportunity to 
modernize Japanese bureaucracy. Emperor Meiji 
and his local lords developed the bureaucracy to 
serve the empire and strengthen the emperor’s 
power over the bureaucracy (Akizuki, 2010; 
Shimizu, 2020) . The internalization of the new 
norm to displace the samurai domination was the 
principal objective of the restoration. Following 
Boin & Christensen (2008), the internalization 
through modernization can be explained as 
follows: first, displacing the dominant samurai 
role and recruiting the young talented employee 
to work in the bureaucracy gained societal 
acceptance. The Meiji’s leading role in advocating 
the new norm of a public servant was the main 
factor of the acceptance. 
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Second, the Japanese empire was the 
Japanese belief system; thus, becoming a public 
servant is part of the societal obligation. The 
end of the samurai era and the role of a public 
employee in serving the emperor evolved into 
new bureaucracy norms. Third, to bolster the 
foundation of the new norm, the emperor 
appointed a prime minister for the first time 
whose task was to manage the bureaucracy for 
delivering Meiji’s interest. Furthermore, the Meiji 
Emperor established the imperial university 
of Tokyo, known as Tokyo University, to train 
and educate the public servant cadre. Such new 
recruitment and education efforts were part of the 
Meiji’s restoration mission to replace the samurai 
and enhance the role of a public servant. As a 
result, the Tokyo University’s function marked 
the institutionalization of Japan’s new civil service 
system.
The Meiji government era (1868-1912) 
marked the modernization of Japan’s public 
administration. In 1885, the emperor endorsed 
the first cabinet system and appointed its prime 
minister. Further, the new cabinet started to 
build a centralized public administration across 
the empire (Imanaka, 2010). The restoration 
also emphasized three basic norms of public 
bureaucracy, which are legality, consensus, and 
seniority. Later on, seniority had resulted in 
the vital role of senior bureaucrats in the policy 
process and development (Akizuki, 2010). The 
modernization of Japan’s public administration 
can be traced from the Meiji era in the 19th 
century. Before the restoration, the samurai (the 
administrative class) controlled the monarchy was 
the samurai aristocrat2 (Akizuki, 2010). 
The dominant role of samurai gained 
its glory at the end of the Edo era. Shogun 
(military general) Tokugawa (the prominent clan) 
2  Samurai are the military officials who have held high-class 
status since the Edo Era (1603-1863). Literally, samurai 
means “saburau” or “to serve.” See Imanaka (2010) and 
Akizuki (2010). 
developed the government’s feudal system to run 
the monarchy. However, the system undermined 
the power of the emperor over the empire’s 
affairs and the bureaucracy. Following Tokugawa’s 
collapse due to conflict among its local lords, the 
major local lords initiated to displace Tokugawa’s 
system and built a new government under the 
direct emperor’s control. However, the reform 
known as Meiji restoration did not diminish the 
prevalent rido tradition of the samurai. Instead, 
the emperor and his supporters utilized it to 
establish a new centralized government system 
under his control. Under the new government, the 
emperor appointed his local lords to post at the 
highest bureaucracy level. The highest position 
the local lords hold is the stronger trust of the 
emperor to them. As a result, they became a new 
elite of the monarchy bureaucracy (Akizuki, 2010; 
Imanaka, 2010).
The Japanese civil service system began 
to adopt the merit principle in 1877, remarked 
by the competitive examination for joining the 
Japanese empire. The recruitment aimed to fill 
the senior public official (kountoukan) and the 
middle-lower level of public officials (hanninkan) 
(Kim, 2002; Imanaka, 2010; Shimizu, 2020). In 
1885 the first prime minister (PM), Hirobumi Ito, 
declared that recruitment of the empire employee 
(the bureaucracy) should apply to a competitive 
selection. A year later, the emperor established 
the Tokyo Imperial University to educate young 
talented public employees, develop knowledge, 
and improve human resource competency to 
serve the monarchy. For centuries, the recruitment 
process was directly under the emperor’s control, 
and even the prime minister could not intervene 
in the process (Imanaka, 2010). 
A school for public bureaucracy education 
had started before the university opened. In 1882, 
the school invited a prominent expert of law 
(staatsrechtswissenschaft) form Germany. Karl 
Rathgen delivered the German cameralist (‘art of 
the state secretariat’) (Akizuki, 2010; Imanaka, 
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2010). Further, PM Ito had also invited Lorenz 
von Stein, the German scholar, who helped the 
prime minister strengthen Japan’s constitutional 
monarchy. Acknowledging von Stein’s idea, 
the prime minister translated the idea into the 
Japanese language and published it in the book as 
guidance for bureaucrats (Akizuki, 2010). 
The adoption of Germanic tradition 
during the modernization of Japan’s public 
administration had resulted in distinct features of 
the bureaucracy. The distinct features designate, 
first, absolute loyalty to the emperor; thus, 
the bureaucrat’s function is “the emperor’s 
servant;” second, the degree of the emperor’s 
trust to the bureaucrat determined its position 
in the bureaucratic ladder. The strongest trust 
the higher position in the bureaucracy. Third, 
meritocracy in terms of competitive selection in 
the recruitment process; and fourth, Japan’s public 
administration did not have a central agency 
to manage the public servant. The authority of 
human resource management is in the hand of 
each public agency or ministry. Therefore, such 
a model gives broad authority to the ministry for 
managing its employees. One of the significant 
policies is a tendency of senior bureaucrats in each 
ministry to look for public employee candidates 
from prestigious universities and their alma mater. 
The distinct feature of bureaucracy adopted 
three basic norms: legality, consensus, and 
seniority (Akizuki, 2010; Burns, 2015). Legality 
stresses that public agencies’ activity should 
follow the rule; therefore, the bureaucrat could 
only decide if only allowed by law. Consensus 
denotes the process of policy-making in which 
bureaucrats tend to accommodate various 
interests, particularly voiced by MPs. The 
consensus became the basic norms since the 
national election in 1918 when the parliament 
initiated the reform to balance power relations 
between parliament and the bureaucracy and to 
take control over civil service from the emperor. 
Meanwhile, seniority represents a prevalent 
tradition of the ancient Japanese village. It was 
translated to the bureaucracy entailing the 
restoration. Seniority does not describe the 
biological age of the bureaucrat but the year of 
recruitment. Bureaucrats who enter the ministry 
in a recruitment year will group a class (doki). 
They compete to gain the highest level of the 
ministry, which is the administrative vice minister. 
Further, part of the seniority is senior bureaucrats’ 
vibrant role in the recruitment process, selecting 
the candidate to work in the ministry.
The evolving characteristics and norms had 
resulted in the “kyaria”system of civil service. 
The system places the bureaucrat who graduated 
from the prestigious university, such as Tokyo 
and Kyoto University, and seniority to obtain a 
privilege for reaching the top of the bureaucracy 
ladder (Mishima, 2017). It becomes the embedded 
norm of the bureaucracy as well as the Japanese 
polity. For instance, after World War II in 1947, 
the US delegation promoted civil service reform. 
Nonetheless, the parliament rejected the proposal 
and argued that the US initiative did not match 
the Japanese bureaucracy that adopted lifetime 
employment and seniority-based promotion 
principles. Meanwhile, the US’ reform initiative 
emphasized the flexible labor market (Akizuki, 
2010).
During the Meiji era, the modernization 
of Japanese public administration created 
prestigious college graduates’ dominance in 
the bureaucracy. For recruiting competent 
and qualified employees, PM Ito delivered the 
emperor’s intention to establish the Imperial 
University of Tokyo as a school for prospective 
public servants. The employee later became the 
bureaucratic elite that determined the Japanese 
government (Imanaka, 2010; Mishima, 2017). 
This tradition is institutionalized and becomes 
the primary norm in the Japanese civil service 
system. Further, the tradition was part of the 
Japanese belief system that places academic 
credentials as social prestige. Thus, the dominance 
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of the alumnus from a prestigious university in 
the bureaucracy increased public trust over the 
government (Mishima, 2017). 
Public acknowledgment regarding the 
bureaucracy is a response to senior bureaucrats’ 
vital role (the mandarins) in Japan’s development. 
As a result, six out of nine prime ministers from 
1945 to 1972 were senior bureaucrats who 
served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry 
of Finance, Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI), and Ministry of Transportation 
(Akizuki, 2010; Imanaka, 2010). The mandarin 
played essential roles in leading the nation out 
of severe crisis after World War II. Even in the 
1970s, the success of Japan’s development became 
a model of industrial countries (Akizuki, 2010).
The Civil Service Development: Embedded 
Norms and the Institutional Mechanism
After the 1994 electoral reform, which 
highlighted politicians and voter relations and the 
two-party competition system, MPs pushed the 
reform regarding parliamentary and bureaucracy 
relations (Mishima, 2017). Following the reform 
initiative, the parliament sequentially has been 
initiating public administration reform since the 
2000s. The Central Government Reform of 2001 
marked the parliament’s reform initiative, and for 
more than a decade, the parliament sequentially 
enforces the reform. In 2014, Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe conducted a significant revision on 
the National Public Service Law/Civil Service 
Law (Kokka Koimun Ho). Its main objectives 
are reconfiguring the delegation-accountability 
model in terms of politicians and the mandarin 
relation, decreasing the mandarin’s dominant 
role in the policy process, and rearranging the 
civil service system focusing on “kyaria” system 
change (Mishima, 2017). 
According to historical institutionalism 
a r g u m e n t a t i o n ,  t h e  “ k ya r i a”  s y s t e m’ s 
embeddedness designates the institutional 
evolution of the civil service system. Applying 
institutional mechanisms postulate, the norm 
institutionalization of Japan’s bureaucracy 
occurs in a social and political context providing 
a favorable opportunity for the actor to build 
the norm. Therefore, in Japan’s cases, the Meiji 
restoration was a starting phase to institutionalize 
the norm, entailing the collapse of the samurai 
feudal system that had weakened the emperor’s 
power over the bureaucracy (Akizuki, 2010; 
Shimizu, 2020). Gradually, the embedded norm 
grows to be the “kyaria”system. 
Later on, the Japanese bureaucracy 
system establishes mandarin domination over 
national affairs. The mandarin’s success in 
leading the countries to be one of the advanced 
industrial countries after World War II bolstered 
public support for them and heightened their 
political and social legitimacy. The growing 
power of the mandarin at the expense of the 
parliament triggered politicians to reform the 
bureaucracy. They intended to put the mandarin 
under parliamentary oversight (Nakamura, 
2003; Masujima, 2005). Thus, the civil service 
reform results from reciprocal relation between 
“kyaria”and politicians in reconfiguring the 
parliament and the bureaucracy relation and 
reducing the mandarin domination.  
The need to conduct civil service reform 
has been a primarily political agenda of the 
nation following the electoral reform of 1994. A 
high-ranking member of the Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP) stressed that the reform could start 
with the civil service’s reorganization. The former 
minister in charge of administrative reform, 
Watanabe Michioi, emphasized the severe public 
bureaucracy problems that demanded the reform 
(Nakamura and Kikuchi, 2011; Mishima, 2017). 
Nakamura and Kikuchi (2011) note that the 
agenda for civil service reform has been a public 
concern in the past ten years. The civil service 
came under attack due to its dominant roles 
(Masujima, 2005). However, the Democratic Party 
of Japan (DPJ) indicated that the LDP government’s 
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inertia in promoting reforms was more due to the 
strong influence of the bureaucracy and the lack 
of understanding of high-ranking officials in the 
cabinet in implementing the reforms. 
Imanaka (2010), who observes the Japanese 
civil service, explains that the government has 
been promoting the civil service since the 2000s. 
The Japanese reform agenda emphasized four focal 
points; first, restructuring the civil service system. 
This policy covered job classifications, improving 
the recruitment, the performance evaluation, and 
payroll system, developing a performance-based 
organization, creating the civil service “fast-track” 
model, and building an education-training system 
to support the civil service to increase knowledge 
and competency. Second, the reform promoted the 
open recruitment of civil service. The objective 
was to attract talented people to work in the 
government. Part of this policy was recruiting 
the best employee from the private sector, 
increasing the woman’s quota in the civil service, 
and promoting a work and family time balance. 
This policy also allowed the public employee to 
work in the private sector for a certain period as 
part of the learning process to improve individual 
capability (Imanaka, 2010). Third, the reform 
set clear rules regarding the mechanism for re-
employing civil servants who have been working 
in the private sector to conduct an anti-lobbying 
mechanism. Fourth, institutional performance 
improvement. It underlined a “national strategy 
staff” to provide input for the prime minister 
when recruiting a public official to assist policy 
development (Imanaka, 2010). 
As the first step, the GCR of 2001 highlighted 
strengthening the function of cabinet office in 
maintaining the civil service system, particularly 
the selection and promotion of senior bureaucrats 
and increasing the number of ministries’ political 
appointees. The law also stated a new system 
of ministry that assigned a parliamentary vice-
minister (seimukan). It intended to increase the 
number of the political appointee and balance the 
power relation with the mandarin. However, the 
reform has not yet satisfied the intention due to 
senior bureaucrats’ resistance in each ministry 
(Mishima, 2013; 2017). 
The mandarin’s persistence in responding 
to the reform is the impact of the “kyaria”system in 
the civil service system that stresses a ministry’s 
authority in recruitment-selection and a closed-
career model. In Japan’s system, the National 
Personnel Authority (NPA), established in 
1948, recruits and selects public employees. 
Nonetheless, the final decision to accept or reject 
the candidate belongs to each ministry. Once 
a candidate passes the examination, the NPA 
will ask the respective ministry to conduct an 
interview, and the senior bureaucrat holds the 
authority to decide the result (Imanaka, 2010). 
As a result, the system establishes a closed-
career model in which a public servant spends 
a career in the ministry and strives to reach 
the highest level in the organization. Seniority 
and long-term performance determine a public 
servant’s promotion in the ministry (Jun & 
Muto, 1995; Mishima, 2017). The employee 
who achieves the top level of the bureaucracy 
is the one who passes the level 1 examination 
(Nakamura & Kikuchi, 2011). This type of 
bureaucrat will be labeled as “kyaria”officials, 
and they will have a clear path to post senior and 
upper-middle positions in the ministry. Therefore, 
“kyaria”officials will post in the strategic position, 
strengthening their roles and influence in the 
ministry. Consequently, a minister or political 
appointee officials who post in the ministry will 
depend on their mandarin to formulate and 
execute policies (Mishima, 2013, 2017).
The privatization was part of the civil 
service reform. For that purpose, the government 
stipulated the Outline of Civil Service Reform 
(Kohmuin Seido Kaikaku Taiko) in December 2001 
(Nakamura & Kikuchi, 2011; Mishima, 2017). The 
outline underscored the intention to increase 
bureaucratic professionalism (Imanaka, 2010). 
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The intention was to challenge the generalist type 
of mandarin in dealing with the dynamic change 
of social and economic context. The domination 
of the “kyaria”official tends to hamper the non 
“kyaria”officials to lead a strategic assignment 
though they have the competency required 
(Mishima, 2013; 2017). 
Further, in 2004, the government issued the 
Policy of Future Administrative Reform to improve 
the coordination mechanism amongst agencies for 
implementing the reform (Imanaka, 2010). The 
poor coordination represents ministerial loyalism, 
which is a strong commitment of bureaucrats to 
protect and promote their ministerial interest 
above all. Such behavior has its origin from 
the “kyaria”closed-career model and cohesive 
relation of senior and upper-middle bureaucrats 
(Nakamura, 2003; Mishima, 2017). The career 
model urges bureaucrats to strive for their 
organizational interests since it will protect 
their careers. Meanwhile, the cohesive relation 
is the impact of bureaucrats’ collective action to 
secure their ministry policies and programs (Jun 
& Muto, 1995) Thus, ministerial loyalty ensured 
that bureaucrats held common goals and policy 
agendas promoted by the ministry (Painter, 2010; 
Mishima, 2017). A senior middle-up bureaucrat 
is the main actor who controls and maintains 
ministerial interests (Mishima, 2017).
The sequential civil service reform had 
resulted in a new Law of National Public Service 
Law of 2007 (the NPSL) or known as the Civil 
Service Law (the CSL). Prime Minister Abe 
established ̀ Discussion Group for Comprehensive 
Reform of the CSS,’ a non-government committee 
to design the reform plan, concomitantly, the 
parliament initiated a revision of the NPSL. As 
a result, the committee recommended a policy 
paper on Civil Service Reform that initiated a 
special committee of civil service reform. The 
committee served the prime minister by providing 
advice and recommendation to maintain the 
reform (Imanaka, 2010). 
Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda took over the 
reform after Abe’s resignation.  Fukuda urged the 
parliament to enact the Basic Law for Reform of 
the CSS in June 2008 (Imanaka, 2010; Mishima, 
2017). The law stressed that the government 
should provide a civil service reform blueprint 
as the committee recommendation. Nonetheless, 
the reform has not yet appropriately worked 
because from 2009 to 2012, the parliament did not 
succeed at stipulating the blueprint. Eventually, 
the returning of Abe to the prime minister’s office 
in 2014 had resulted in the new NPSL (Mishima, 
2017).
Meritocracy and the Japanese Mandarin
The development of  Japan’s public 
administrat ion shows the  inst i tut ional 
change and formation in civil service reform. 
The “kyaria”system results from the norm 
institutionalization that began in the Meiji 
restoration that, in turn, creates a distinctive 
feature of Japan’s public administration. On one 
side, the system represents the success of public 
administration modernization. It enhances the 
government’s capability to maintain development 
policy bringing the nations out of severe crisis 
post World War II and becoming an advanced 
industrial country. On the other side, the system 
has resulted in senior bureaucrats’ vital role in the 
policy process and its relation to the parliament. 
Sequential reform since 2000 exhibits the 
intention of the prime minister and elected official 
to reduce the mandarin’s domination and heighten 
the parliamentary control over the bureaucracy. 
Such dynamic institutional reform shows 
not only the resilience of the mandarin in 
protecting their interest but also the contribution 
of the “kyaria”in creating a persistent civil service 
system. The “kyaria”produces four elements 
shaping the civil service system: autonomous and 
centralized personnel administration, seniority 
promotion, professional socialization, and post-
retirement employment (Mishima, 2013; 2017). 
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First, an autonomous and centralized 
personnel administration denotes ministry 
authority in managing its employees (Mishima, 
2013, 2017). The NPA holds the authority 
for recruitment and selection, but the final 
decision belongs to the ministry. Within the 
ministry, mandarin plays an essential role in the 
recruitment process since the minister relies on 
senior bureaucrats’ recommendations before 
issuing the result. Such a mechanism designates 
the centralized decision making in the hand of 
ministry and the mandarin. Second, seniority 
and long-term records of performance determine 
the career promotion of bureaucrats. Seniority 
represents a recruitment year of the employee, 
and it takes about twenty years for an employee 
to reach the highest level in the bureaucracy. 
The long term career model aims to have the 
track-record of the bureaucrat’s performance 
and loyalty to the ministerial interest (Mishima, 
2013; 2017). 
Third, professional socialization intends 
to internalize norms, policy paradigm, and 
ministerial interest to public employees. In doing 
so, the ministry conducts on-the-job training 
continuously and builds employees’ collective 
behavior (Mishima, 2013; 2017). Part of the 
on-job training, every two years, an employee 
has different assignments aiming to enhance 
knowledge and experience. As a result, such 
an assignment model will create a generalist 
employee. Thus, the tour of duty inclines the 
level 1 employee or the “kyaria” official to 
reach the top level of bureaucracy (Nakamura 
and Kikuchi, 2011). Meanwhile, in promoting 
collective behavior, the ministry designs the 
teamwork for the assignment. Consequently, 
Japan’s performance system emphasizes team 
performance rather than individual one (Imanaka, 
2010). Such performance assessment leads to 
organizational collectiveness. 
Fourth, amakudari is a tradition to help 
the retired employee work in non-government 
agencies (Mishima, 2013; 2017). In Japan’s 
civil service system, the competition among 
bureaucrats to reach the highest position will 
result in an advantaged and disadvantaged group. 
Those who are disadvantaged face the end of 
their career; thus, they choose to resign from 
the office. By promoting the retired to work in 
non-government agencies, the tradition keeps 
the senior bureaucrat’s loyalty and secures 
the ministerial interest. In the parliament and 
bureaucracy relation, politicians often persuade 
the retired senior bureaucrat to support the 
parliament in dealing with the mandarin. This 
maneuver is part of the politicians’ intention 
to heighten political control over the senior 
bureaucrat (Nakamura, 2003; Masujima, 2005). 
The prevalent “kyaria” system has its roots 
from the public administration modernization 
of the Meiji restoration. Educating and training 
public employee cadre is one of the significant 
modernization initiatives. The establishment of 
the Imperial University of Tokyo, and later Kyoto, 
marked Japan’s new civil service system. Since 
the restoration, the respective and prestigious 
universities play essential roles in the recruitment 
of employees. The student who graduated from the 
prestigious university becomes a public servant 
and gains privileges in the career promotion. 
Further, the relation between the bureaucrat 
and the newly recruited employee denotes 
the university’s clique. The most prestigious 
university graduates will have a clear career path 
to post the top level of bureaucracy (Imanaka, 
2010; Nakamura & Kikuchi, 2011). 
Most of the high-ranking officials graduated 
from the prestigious universities to show their 
favor for recruiting a new candidate for a public 
employee from their university. The tradition 
denotes the alumnus’s obligation, who posts a 
high-ranking level in the government, supervises, 
and provides an opportunity for the new graduate 
to join the respective agency. In turn, such a new 
tradition had established the senior and junior 
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relationships that shaped public employee 
recruitment in the new Japanese civil service. 
(Nishikawa, 2006 in Nakamura dan Kikuchi, 
2011). The Japan civil service system has designed 
a career model supported by a recruitment 
process. 
The career model denotes three civil 
service classes consisting of the first class or the 
elite bureaucrat, the second and the third classes 
(Kim, 2002; Nakamura dan Kikuchi, 2011). The 
government prepares the first class for a high 
position in public bureaucracy. The elite class has 
a fast track for its career promotion; therefore, 
the public acknowledges the first class as “bullet 
trains.” The term refers to the fast and definite 
career path once the first-class employee starts 
his/her career. Most of the first-class members 
graduated from the prestigious university. 
Meanwhile, the second-class positions 
are filled by applicants who hold a degree from 
the college or have a diploma degree. Their 
assignment supports the first-class bureaucrat 
by providing a policy analysis based on their 
expertise (Kim, 2002; Nakamura & Kikuchi, 2011). 
Unlike the first class, the second-class employee 
has a minimal opportunity to reach the highest 
level in the agency. It is casuistic that the second-
class employee accomplishes his/her career as 
the top-level bureaucrat. Though the second-
class track provides a spare change for a public 
employee to reach the agency’s highest position, 
most university graduates tend to choose the 
second class position for their career path. Two 
factors drive their motive; that is a job assurance 
and incentive. 
The competition for promotion in the 
second-class position is not too intense, unlike 
the first class. Further, having a secure position 
in the second-class allows the employee to gain 
an adequate incentive (Kim, 2002; Nakamura 
and Kikuchi, 2011). The lowest-level in civil 
service is the third-class that has an assignment 
for a clerical job. The primary qualification for 
the position is a senior high school graduate. The 
government assigned most of them to a junior 
staff position in many government agencies (Kim, 
2002; Nakamura & Kikuchi, 2011).
Classification of rank and position in the 
Japan civil service system describes not only roles, 
functions, and job grading of the civil servant but 
also defines the privilege of the public official. The 
first-class public official that is a “kyaria” official 
is known as the “the bullet train,” because he 
gains a high chance to reach a top-level position 
in agencies.
Furthermore, the domination of graduates 
from respected and prestigious universities has 
shaped the civil service system’s tradition. The 
senior and junior relations in the civil service 
tradition, who graduated from the same university, 
affect recruitment, selection, and promotion. The 
tradition contributes to creating a strong central 
bureaucracy and the mandarin’s domination in 
the policy process. 
Conclusion
Meiji’s modernization initiative has resulted 
in Japan’s distinctive public administration 
fe a t u re s .  U n d e r  t h e  M e i j i  re s to ra t i o n , 
modernization designates a combination of 
Japanese and Germanic norms in establishing a 
new bureaucracy. Germanic tradition supports 
Japan’s constitutional monarchy and the design 
of a robust central bureaucracy aiding the empire. 
The combination of two traditions produces a 
new bureaucratic norm replacing the samurai’s 
domination that undermines the emperor’s 
control over the empire and its bureaucracy. 
During the Meiji era, norm institutionalization 
has established the new norms and civil service 
systems leading to substantial and dominant roles 
of senior bureaucrats (the mandarin). The basic 
norms consisting of legality, consensus, and seniority 
become pillars of “kyaria” denoting recruitment, 
selection, and promotion of the bureaucrats 
influenced by seniority, long term performance, 
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knowledge and experience of the government 
affairs. Thus, conducting cautious reform and, at 
the same time, working closely with the mandarin 
are the primary strategy of the parliament in 
reforming the bureaucracy.
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